HomeBox has Unauthorized API Access via Retained defaultGroup ID After Group Access Revocation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.25.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
HomeBox is a home inventory and organization system. Versions prior to 0.25.0 contain a vulnerability where the defaultGroup ID remained permanently assigned to a user after being invited to a group, even after their access to that group was revoked. While the web interface correctly enforced the access revocation and prevented the user from viewing or modifying the group's contents, the API did not. Because the original group ID persisted as the user's defaultGroup, and this value was not properly validated when the X-Tenant header was omitted, the user could still perform full CRUD operations on the group's collections through the API, bypassing the intended access controls. This issue has been fixed in version 0.25.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- sysadminsmedia homebox
fixed in 0.25.0