CVE-2026-40068GHSA-Q5HJ-MXQH-VV77
Claude Code arbitrary code execution via git worktree commondir trust dialog bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.1.84
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
CISA's decision points: whether it is exploited, whether attacks can be automated, and how much control an attacker gets. Assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).What do these mean? →
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In versions 2.1.63 through 2.1.83 of Claude Code, the folder trust determination logic used the git worktree commondir file without validating its contents. An attacker could craft a malicious repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, causing Claude Code to bypass its trust confirmation dialog and immediately execute hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploitation requires the victim to clone the malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and the attacker must know or guess a path the victim had already trusted. This issue has been fixed in version 2.1.84.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- anthropics claude-code
From 2.1.63 · fixed in 2.1.84
- @anthropic-ai/claude-codenpm
From 2.1.63 · fixed in 2.1.84