TypeBot: Async filter() bypasses authorization, allowing IDOR in getLinkedTypebots and leaking cross-workspace bot definitions
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.16.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
TypeBot is a chatbot builder tool. In versions 3.15.2, the getLinkedTypebots API endpoint returns full bot definitions to any authenticated user who references a target bot ID in a Typebot Link block, regardless of workspace ownership, leading to IDOR. The authorization check uses Array.filter() with an async callback — since filter() is synchronous, the callback always returns a truthy Promise, so the access control predicate is never actually evaluated. Any authenticated Typebot user can read the full definition of any other workspace's private bots, including: all conversation blocks and logic flow, variable values embedded in the bot (credentials, API keys, PII), webhook URLs and integration configurations. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- baptisteArno typebot.io
fixed in 3.16.0