Multiple unauthenticated denial-of-service (DoS) issues in fohrloop dash-uploader v0.1.0 through v0.7.0a2.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.7.0a1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 proof of concept on GitHub, 1 Nuclei template
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Multiple unauthenticated denial-of-service (DoS) issues in fohrloop dash-uploader v0.1.0 through v0.7.0a2. The chunked-upload handler (dash_uploader/httprequesthandler.py, dash_uploader/upload.py) trusts unsanitized, attacker-controlled upload parameters (e.g. flowTotalChunks) and does not enforce the documented max_file_size limit, allowing a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause an out-of-memory (OOM) process crash (unbounded range(1, flowTotalChunks + 1) allocation), truncation of the target file to zero bytes (flowTotalChunks=0, where the all([]) == True quirk runs the file-assembly branch on zero chunks), permanent disk exhaustion (never-cleaned-up temporary directories per flowIdentifier), and a complete bypass of the documented max_file_size limit.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- n/a n/a
Version range not reported
- dash-uploaderPyPI
From 0.1.0 · fixed in 0.7.0a1