Saleor has Cross-Account Email Change via Unbound Confirmation Token
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.20.118, 3.21.54, 3.22.47, 3.23.0a3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Saleor is an e-commerce platform. From 2.10.0 to before 3.23.0a3, 3.22.47, 3.21.54, and 3.20.118, a business-logic and authorization flaw was found in the account email change workflow, the confirmation flow did not verify that the email change confirmation token was issued for the given authenticated user. As a result, a valid email-change token generated for one account can be replayed while authenticated as a different account. The second account’s email address is then updated to the token's new_email, even though that token was never issued for that account. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.23.0a3, 3.22.47, 3.21.54, and 3.20.118.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- saleor saleor
From 2.10.0 · fixed in 3.20.118; From 3.21.0-a.0 · fixed in 3.21.54; From 3.22.0-a.0 · fixed in 3.22.47; From 3.23.0-a.0 · fixed in 3.23.0a3