Rack: Rack::Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded paths
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.2.23, 3.1.21, 3.2.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Static#applicable_rules evaluates several header_rules types against the raw URL-encoded PATH_INFO, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that header_rules were intended to apply. In deployments that rely on Rack::Static to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rack rack
fixed in 2.2.23; From 3.0.0.beta1 · fixed in 3.1.21; From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.2.6
- rackRubyGems
fixed in 2.2.23
- rackRubyGems
From 3.0.0.beta1 · fixed in 3.1.21
- rackRubyGems
From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.2.6