Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 39.8.0, 40.7.0, 41.0.0-beta.8
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. From versions 39.0.0-alpha.1 to before 39.8.0, 40.0.0-alpha.1 to before 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-alpha.1 to before 41.0.0-beta.8, apps that pass VideoFrame objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the contextBridge are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged VideoFrame to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a VideoFrame object to the main world via contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld(). Apps that do not bridge VideoFrame objects are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 39.8.0, 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-beta.8.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
From 39.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 39.8.0; From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.7.0; From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.0.0-beta.8
- electronnpm
From 39.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 39.8.0
- electronnpm
From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.7.0
- electronnpm
From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.0.0-beta.8