Electron: Registry key path injection in app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient on Windows
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, 41.0.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0, on Windows, app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol) did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under HKCU\Software\Classes\, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers. Apps are only affected if they call app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient() with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
fixed in 38.8.6; From 39.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 39.8.1; From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.8.1; From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.0.0
- electronnpm
fixed in 38.8.6
- electronnpm
From 39.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 39.8.1
- electronnpm
From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.8.1
- electronnpm
From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.0.0