OpenEXR has a signed integer overflow (undefined behavior) in undo_pxr24_impl may allow bounds-check bypass in PXR24 decompression
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, 3.4.9
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.2.0 to before 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9, a signed integer overflow exists in undo_pxr24_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_pxr24.c at line 377. The expression (uint64_t)(w * 3) computes w * 3 as a signed 32-bit integer before casting to uint64_t. When w is large, this multiplication constitutes undefined behavior under the C standard. On tested builds (clang/gcc without sanitizers), two's-complement wraparound commonly occurs, and for specific values of w the wrapped result is a small positive integer, which may allow the subsequent bounds check to pass incorrectly. If the check is bypassed, the decoding loop proceeds to write pixel data through dout, potentially extending far beyond the allocated output buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr
From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.2.7; From 3.3.0 · fixed in 3.3.9; From 3.4.0 · fixed in 3.4.9