Fastify's Missing End Anchor in "subtypeNameReg" Allows Malformed Content-Types to Pass Validation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.8.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Fastify incorrectly accepts malformed `Content-Type` headers containing trailing characters after the subtype token, in violation of RFC 9110 §8.3.1(https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9110.html#field.content-type). For example, a request sent with Content-Type: application/json garbage passes validation and is processed normally, rather than being rejected with 415 Unsupported Media Type. When regex-based content-type parsers are in use (a documented Fastify feature), the malformed value is matched against registered parsers using the full string including the trailing garbage. This means a request with an invalid content-type may be routed to and processed by a parser it should never have reached. Impact: An attacker can send requests with RFC-invalid Content-Type headers that bypass validity checks, reach content-type parser matching, and be processed by the server. Requests that should be rejected at the validation stage are instead handled as if the content-type were valid. Workarounds: Deploy a WAF rule to protect against this Fix: The fix is available starting with v5.8.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- fastify fastify
From 5.7.2 · fixed in 5.8.1
- fastifynpm
From 5.7.2 · fixed in 5.8.1