Rails Active Storage has possible content type bypass via metadata in direct uploads
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.1.2.1, 8.0.4.1, 7.2.3.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Active Storage allows users to attach cloud and local files in Rails applications. Prior to versions 8.1.2.1, 8.0.4.1, and 7.2.3.1, `DirectUploadsController` accepts arbitrary metadata from the client and persists it on the blob. Because internal flags like `identified` and `analyzed` are stored in the same metadata hash, a direct-upload client can set these flags to skip MIME detection and analysis. This allows an attacker to upload arbitrary content while claiming a safe `content_type`, bypassing any validations that rely on Active Storage's automatic content type identification. Versions 8.1.2.1, 8.0.4.1, and 7.2.3.1 contain a patch.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rails activestorage
From 8.1.0.beta1 · fixed in 8.1.2.1; From 8.0.0.beta1 · fixed in 8.0.4.1; fixed in 7.2.3.1
- activestorageRubyGems
From 8.1.0.beta1 · fixed in 8.1.2.1
- activestorageRubyGems
From 8.0.0.beta1 · fixed in 8.0.4.1
- activestorageRubyGems
fixed in 7.2.3.1