PySpector: Plugin Sandbox Bypass leads to Arbitrary Code Execution
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.7
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. PySpector versions 0.1.6 and prior are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The validate_plugin_code() function in plugin_system.py, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the internal resolve_name() helper only handles ast.Name and ast.Attribute node types, returning None for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via getattr() (such as getattr(os, 'system')) the outer call's func node is of type ast.Call, causing resolve_name() to return None, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ParzivalHack PySpector
fixed in 0.1.7
- pyspectorPyPI
fixed in 0.1.7