DoS in Quill via unbounded read of HTTP response body during notarization
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.7.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Quill provides simple mac binary signing and notarization from any platform. Quill before version v0.7.1 has unbounded reads of HTTP response bodies during the Apple notarization process. Exploitation requires the ability to modify API responses from Apple's notarization service, which is not possible under standard network conditions due to HTTPS with proper TLS certificate validation; however, environments with TLS-intercepting proxies (common in corporate networks), compromised certificate authorities, or other trust boundary violations are at risk. When processing HTTP responses during notarization, Quill reads the entire response body into memory without any size limit. An attacker who can control or modify the response content can return an arbitrarily large payload, causing the Quill client to run out of memory and crash. The impact is limited to availability; there is no effect on confidentiality or integrity. Both the Quill CLI and library are affected when used to perform notarization operations. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- anchore quill
fixed in 0.7.1
- github.com/anchore/quillGo
fixed in 0.7.1