smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.1, 6.1.175, 6.6.141, 6.12.91, 6.18.24, and 2 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server. symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset 0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits. smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0. With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2). Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset. Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in 043834e72337ee7b4e9685859888623ba1504ac7; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in d65a64755a3df68a2fd19d2a81395e9f723aca23; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in 20ac98f0eb6047edb73c9a27af782bdde08b3757; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in e0dd90d14cbbf318157ea8e3fb62ee68a28655ed; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in 781902e069f4ecb6c3b83502f181972c1446110a; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in a66ef2e7ed837325c5600f8617d5ee0a0a149fdd; From 76894f3e2f71177747b8b4763fb180e800279585 · fixed in 3df690bba28edec865cf7190be10708ad0ddd67e; From 6.0.16 · fixed in 6.1
- Linux Linux
6.1
- KernelLinux
From 6.1.0 · fixed in 6.1.175; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.6.141; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.91; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.24; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 6.19.14; From 6.20.0 · fixed in 7.0.1
References 7
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/043834e72337ee7b4e9685859888623ba1504ac7
- stable/c/d65a64755a3df68a2fd19d2a81395e9f723aca23
- stable/c/20ac98f0eb6047edb73c9a27af782bdde08b3757
- stable/c/e0dd90d14cbbf318157ea8e3fb62ee68a28655ed
- stable/c/781902e069f4ecb6c3b83502f181972c1446110a
- stable/c/a66ef2e7ed837325c5600f8617d5ee0a0a149fdd
- stable/c/3df690bba28edec865cf7190be10708ad0ddd67e