Capsule Namespace Hijacking via subresource
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.13.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. To defend against namespace hijacking achieved through update/patch operations on namespaces, Capsule uses a webhook to validate update requests targeting namespaces. However, in Kubernetes, the namespace/finalize and namespace/status subresource APIs can also modify various fields of a namespace, including the metadata field. Prior to version 0.13.0, the webhook does not define interception rules for these subresources. As a result, if a tenant administrator has permission to modify namespace/status or namespace/finalize, they can successfully perform namespace hijacking. Version 0.13.0 fixes the issue. Another mitigation is to add two subresources (namespaces and snamespaces/status with namespace/finalize within it) to the resources list in the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration rules.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- projectcapsule capsule
fixed in 0.13.0
- github.com/projectcapsule/capsuleGo
fixed in 0.13.0