Feathers has an origin validation bypass via prefix matching
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.0.40
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Feathersjs is a framework for creating web APIs and real-time applications with TypeScript or JavaScript. In versions 5.0.39 and below, origin validation uses startsWith() for comparison, allowing attackers to bypass the check by registering a domain that shares a common prefix with an allowed origin.The getAllowedOrigin() function checks if the Referer header starts with any allowed origin, and this comparison is insufficient as it only validates the prefix. This is exploitable when the origins array is configured and an attacker registers a domain starting with an allowed origin string (e.g., https://target.com.attacker.com bypasses https://target.com). On its own, tokens are still redirected to a configured origin. However, in specific scenarios an attacker can initiate the OAuth flow from an unauthorized origin and exfiltrate tokens, achieving full account takeover. This issue has bee fixed in version 5.0.40.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- feathersjs feathers
fixed in 5.0.40
- @feathersjs/authentication-oauthnpm
fixed in 5.0.40