OpenClaw: Unsanitized CWD path injection into LLM prompts
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.2.15
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions. Starting in version 2026.2.15, the workspace path is sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace path resolution also applies the same sanitization as defense-in-depth.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- openclaw openclaw
fixed in 2026.2.15
- openclawnpm
fixed in 2026.2.15