OpenClaw has Missing Webhook Authentication in Telnyx Provider Allowing Unauthenticated Requests
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.2.14
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Versions 2026.2.13 and below allow the optional @openclaw/voice-call plugin Telnyx webhook handler to accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when telnyx.publicKey is not configured, enabling unauthenticated callers to forge Telnyx events. Telnyx webhooks are expected to be authenticated via Ed25519 signature verification. In affected versions, TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() could effectively fail open when no Telnyx public key was configured, allowing arbitrary HTTP POST requests to the voice-call webhook endpoint to be treated as legitimate Telnyx events. This only impacts deployments where the Voice Call plugin is installed, enabled, and the webhook endpoint is reachable from the attacker (for example, publicly exposed via a tunnel/proxy). The issue has been fixed in version 2026.2.14.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- openclaw openclaw
fixed in 2026.2.14
- openclawnpm
fixed in 2026.2.14