OpenEMR's Portal Payment Endpoint Trusts User-Controlled pid
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.0.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to version 8.0.0, in `portal/portal_payment.php`, the patient id used for the page is taken from the request (`$pid = $_REQUEST['pid'] ?? $pid` and `$pid = ($_REQUEST['hidden_patient_code'] ?? null) > 0 ? $_REQUEST['hidden_patient_code'] : $pid`) instead of being fixed to the authenticated portal user. The portal session already has a valid `$pid` for the logged-in patient. Overwriting it with user-supplied values and using it without authorization allows a portal user to view and interact with another patient's demographics, invoices, and payment history—horizontal privilege escalation and IDOR. Version 8.0.0 contains a fix for the issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- openemr openemr
fixed in 8.0.0