OpenProject has Forced Actions, Content Spoofing, and Persistent DoS via ID Manipulation in OpenProject Blocknote Editor Extension
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 17.0.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenProject is an open-source, web-based project management software. In the new editor for collaborative documents based on BlockNote, OpenProject maintainers added a custom extension in OpenProject version 17.0.0 that allows to mention OpenProject work packages in the document. To show work package details, the editor loads details about the work package via the OpenProject API. For this API call, the extension to the BlockNote editor did not properly validate the given work package ID to be only a number. This allowed an attacker to generate a document with relative links that upon opening could make arbitrary `GET` requests to any URL within the OpenProject instance. This issue was patched in version version 0.0.22 of op-blocknote-extensions, which was shipped with OpenProject 17.0.2. If users cannot update immediately to version 17.0.2 of OpenProject, administrators can disable collaborative document editing in Settings -> Documents -> Real time collaboration -> Disable.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- opf openproject
From 17.0.0 · fixed in 17.0.2