EvseV2G has sequence state validation bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
EVerest is an EV charging software stack. In versions up to and including 2025.12.1, it is possible to bypass the sequence state verification including authentication, and send requests that transition to forbidden states relative to the current one, thereby updating the current context with illegitimate data.cThanks to the modular design of EVerest, authorization is handled in a separate module and EVSEManager Charger internal state machine cannot transition out of the `WaitingForAuthentication` state through ISO 15118-2 communication. From this state, it was however possible through ISO 15118-2 messages which are published to the MQTT server to trick it into preparing to charge, and even to prepare to send current. The final requirement to actually send current to the EV was the closure of the contactors, which does not appear to be possible without leaving the `WaitingForAuthentication` state and leveraging ISO 15118-2 messages. As of time of publication, no fixed versions are available.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- EVerest everest-core
through 2025.12.1