apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
4.13
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/a92c5e5086a87d082696245a8607666da3d80554
- stable/c/667df93769c02ff581c77d2d8f162147e719c557
- stable/c/3ddb961d2929bbb3204a2bba21b5d8153cd3f7cc
- stable/c/ae10787d955fb255d381e0d5589451dd72c614b1
- stable/c/eecce026399917f6efa532c56bc7a3e9dd6ee68b
- stable/c/13bc2772414d68e94e273dea013181a986948ddf
- stable/c/2a732ed26fbd048e7925d227af8cf9ea43fb5cc9
- stable/c/8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3