Strapi: Password Reset Does Not Revoke Existing Refresh Sessions

Summary

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.

Timeline

1. May 14, 2026, 6:38 PM UTCCVE published
2. May 15, 2026, 2:50 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. May 15, 2026, 2:52 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• strapi strapi

  fixed in 5.33.3

• strapi @strapi/admin

  fixed in 5.33.3

• strapi @strapi/plugin-users-permissions

  fixed in 5.33.3

• @strapi/adminnpm

  fixed in 5.33.3

• @strapi/plugin-users-permissionsnpm

  fixed in 5.33.3

References 2