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CVE-2026-19741GHSA-6J2R-XRM4-3V7F

OpenThread joiner autostart uses a publicly documented default Joining Device Credential (PSKd)

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 4.5.0
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

Zephyr RTOS builds that enable OpenThread joiner autostart without overriding the default Joining Device Credential are affected. An attacker within radio range of an uncommissioned device could use the publicly documented default credential to complete Thread commissioning and push a malicious network configuration, causing the device to join the attacker's mesh and exposing its network traffic.

Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.

Read the original description

Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset. The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination. The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now

Affected versions

  • zephyr

    From 1.14.0 · fixed in 4.5.0

References 2

GitHub · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr