Kong Mesh multi-zone: the global control plane attributes KDS-synced resources by an unvalidated in-band zone identifier
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.7.29, 2.9.19, 2.11.18, 2.12.14, 2.13.10, and 1 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
On a Kong Mesh global control plane, resources received over the zone-to-global KDS sync are attributed using the in-band, sender-controlled ControlPlane.Identifier rather than the authenticated zone identity derived from the connection. Authenticated zones can have the global control plane store and re-distribute those resources as belonging to another zone. The result is a cross-zone isolation bypass: the holder of a single enrolled zone's credential can inject, attribute, and overwrite resources in another zone's namespace mesh-wide. The root cause lives in Kuma's open-source KDS sync code, which Kong Mesh's control plane is built on.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Kong Inc. Kong Mesh
fixed in 2.7.29; From 2.8.0 · fixed in 2.9.19; From 2.10.0 · fixed in 2.11.18; From 2.12.0 · fixed in 2.12.14; From 2.13.0 · fixed in 2.13.10; From 2.14.0 · fixed in 2.14.2