Path traversal vulnerability in GitHub Enterprise Server allowed writing files to arbitrary repository paths, including GitHub Actions workflow files, via unchecked Dependabot dependency-file paths
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability was identified in GitHub Enterprise Server that allowed an attacker who had code execution inside the Dependabot updater container to write files to arbitrary repository paths, including GitHub Actions workflow files under .github/workflows/ as the path validation did not check the effective path which the attacker could control through the dependency file's directory and symlink target. If the repository used a pull_request_target workflow or had auto-merge enabled, an injected workflow could execute with access to the repository's GitHub Actions secrets. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise Server prior to 3.22 and was fixed in versions 3.21.3, 3.20.5, 3.19.9, 3.18.12, 3.17.18.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- GitHub Enterprise Server
From 3.17.0 · through 3.17.17; From 3.18.0 · through 3.18.11; From 3.19.0 · through 3.19.8; From 3.20.0 · through 3.20.4; From 3.21.0 · through 3.21.2