Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in check_for_language()
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.0.8, 5.2.17
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
An issue was discovered in Django 5.2 before 5.2.17 and 6.0 before 6.0.8. `django.utils.translation.check_for_language()` is subject to a potential denial-of-service attack when given many distinct, very long language codes, which are retained as keys in an in-memory cache and consume process memory. Such codes reach the function through the `django.views.i18n.set_language()` view, which is not routed by default. The consumed memory is bounded, since request data is limited by the `DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE` setting (default 2.5 MB) and the cache holds a fixed maximum number of entries. Earlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.1.x, 5.0.x, and 4.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected. Django would like to thank Jaeyoung Jang for reporting this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- django
From 6.0 · fixed in 6.0.8; From 5.2 · fixed in 5.2.17