Session takeover via Auth Proxy cache key collision
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).
Timeline
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Grafana Grafana Enterprise
From 11.0.0 · through 11.6.17; From 12.0.0 · through 12.2.11; From 12.3.0 · through 12.3.11; From 12.4.0 · through 12.4.9; From 13.0.0 · through 13.0.7; From 13.1.0 · through 13.1.4; From 13.2.0 · through 13.2.0
- Grafana Grafana OSS
From 11.0.0 · through 11.6.17; From 12.0.0 · through 12.2.11; From 12.3.0 · through 12.3.11; From 12.4.0 · through 12.4.9; From 13.0.0 · through 13.0.7; From 13.1.0 · through 13.1.4; From 13.2.0 · through 13.2.0