Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly <= 27.7 - Authenticated (Staff+) Insecure Direct Object Reference to Sensitive Information Exposure via 'params[id]' Parameter

Summary

The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.

Timeline

1. Aug 16, 2026, 4:24 AM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 17, 2026, 2:13 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Aug 17, 2026, 4:06 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• ladela Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly

  through 27.7

References 8