Unsafe Deserialization in keras.layers.TorchModuleWrapper.from_config
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.12.3, 3.15.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
A vulnerability in keras-team/keras version 3.15.0 allows unsafe deserialization of attacker-controlled PyTorch pickle data through the public `keras.layers.TorchModuleWrapper.from_config` method. This method invokes `torch.load(..., weights_only=False)` without requiring an explicit unsafe opt-in, such as a `safe_mode=False` parameter. When called outside a `SafeModeScope(True)` context, the absence of an ambient safe mode state permits unsafe deserialization by default. This issue can lead to arbitrary code execution if untrusted Keras layer configurations are processed using this method. The vulnerability arises because the method does not enforce safe deserialization practices unless explicitly guarded by Keras safe mode.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- keras-team keras-team/keras
Version range not reported
- kerasPyPI
fixed in 3.12.3
- kerasPyPI
From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.15.0
- kerasPyPI
fixed in 3.12.3; From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.15.0