Business::GoCardless versions before 1.01 for Perl complete redirect flows without checking the session token, letting a leaked redirect…
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.01
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Business::GoCardless for Perl (versions before 1.01) is affected by a flaw in how it completes GoCardless redirect flows. An attacker who obtains another customer's redirect flow ID could create payments or subscriptions charged against that customer's mandate.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Business::GoCardless versions before 1.01 for Perl complete redirect flows without checking the session token, letting a leaked redirect flow ID create payments against another customer's mandate. confirm_resource takes no session token from the caller. It reads the redirect flow back from the GoCardless API and completes it with the token from that response, so the check that the flow is completed by the session that started it always passes. It then creates the requested payment or subscription against the flow's mandate. Since version 1.00, a flow that already has a mandate is returned as confirmed without being completed again, so the same ID creates a new payment on every call. A remote attacker who obtains another customer's redirect flow ID can create payments or subscriptions against that customer's mandate.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Business-GoCardless
fixed in 1.01