CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow OS command execution via sqlite3 shell commands in a restored configuration backup
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.62.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
CallBackery, a Perl-based web application for managing configuration, is affected when it restores a configuration backup. A malicious backup file can carry commands that run on the server as the application user, letting an attacker who can supply a backup take control of the system.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow OS command execution via sqlite3 shell commands in a restored configuration backup. restoreConfigBlob() feeds the database dump in a backup to the sqlite3 command-line shell. The shell runs lines starting with a dot as its own commands, so .shell or .system in the dump runs an OS command and .load loads native code. Anyone who can supply a backup to be restored can run arbitrary commands as the application user.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- CallBackery
fixed in 0.62.0