CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl encrypt configuration backups with the padded password as the AES key
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.62.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
CallBackery, a Perl application for managing configuration backups, is affected in versions before 0.62.0. An attacker who obtains a backup file can guess its password quickly offline and then read every credential stored inside it.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl encrypt configuration backups with the padded password as the AES key. getCrypt() pads the backup password with "x" characters and cuts it to 32 bytes to form the AES key, with no salt and no key derivation. The first block of a backup holds a 16 hex digit length field, so decrypting one block confirms a password guess at raw AES speed. An attacker who obtains a backup can recover its password by fast offline guessing, and with it every credential the backup holds.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- CallBackery
fixed in 0.62.0