Forge: Certificate signature verified with the issuer's RSA signature scheme
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.4.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Forge (node-forge), a JavaScript implementation of Transport Layer Security, is affected. An attacker could get a certificate accepted with a different signature scheme than the one it declares, which could bypass policies that require a specific signature scheme, though it does not allow forging certificate identity.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used certificate.verify(child), _verifySignature(), lib/x509.js to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge selected RSA padding and RSASSA-PSS parameters from the issuer certificate rather than the child certificate being verified. A child labeled as RSASSA-PSS could therefore be accepted with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature when the issuer used PKCS#1 v1.5. The signature still had to be produced with the trusted issuer's private key, so this did not permit certificate identity forgery, but it could bypass policies that require a declared signature scheme. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- digitalbazaar forge
fixed in 1.4.1