Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.4.0, 4.16.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The Echo web framework for Go is affected, specifically how it determines whether a request arrived over HTTPS. Because it trusted scheme headers sent by any client, attackers can bypass HTTPS redirects and suppress HSTS headers, weakening transport security.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- labstack echo
From 5.0.0 · fixed in 5.4.0; fixed in 4.16.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/v5Go
fixed in 5.4.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/v4Go
fixed in 4.16.0