Echo: Reverse Proxy Forwards Attacker-Supplied X-Real-IP to Upstream by Default
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.4.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Echo, a Go web framework, is affected when its Proxy middleware is used without an IP extractor configured. A remote client can make upstream services receive a spoofed client IP address, which could undermine IP-based access controls, rate limiting, audit logs, or geographic restrictions.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 5.4.0, the Proxy middleware can preserve an attacker-supplied X-Real-IP header and forward it to an upstream service when Echo.IPExtractor is not configured. A remote client can therefore make upstream services receive a spoofed client address, undermining IP-based access controls, rate limiting, audit logging, or geographic restrictions that trust Echo's forwarded identity. This issue is fixed in Echo 5.4.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- labstack echo
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 5.4.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/v5Go
fixed in 5.4.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/v4Go
From 4.0.0 · through 4.16.2