UpdateHub probe: uninitialized-heap out-of-bounds read of network-supplied metadata

Summary

The UpdateHub OTA client in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c contains an out-of-bounds / uninitialized-memory read in z_impl_updatehub_probe(). The probe response from the UpdateHub server is copied into a heap buffer (metadata) that is correctly NUL-terminated, but a second buffer (metadata_copy) is allocated with k_malloc (unzeroed) and filled with memcpy(metadata_copy, metadata, strlen(metadata)), which omits the terminating NUL. Everything after the copied content remains uninitialized heap. When the first json_obj_parse() over the array descriptor fails, the code falls back to json_obj_parse(metadata_copy, strlen(metadata_copy), ...). The strlen() call scans past the copied bytes through uninitialized heap and, if no zero byte is found before the end of the allocation, reads beyond the buffer; the resulting over-long length is then parsed as JSON. The probe payload is fully controlled by the (malicious, compromised, or — without the optional CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS — on-path) UpdateHub server, which can craft a large payload that fails the first parse to drive this path. The consequence is a read of uninitialized heap, with a worst case of an out-of-bounds read past the metadata_copy allocation that can fault and crash the update thread/device, producing a network-triggerable denial of service. The over-read data is consumed only internally to evaluate the update and is not returned to the attacker, so there is no direct information disclosure and no out-of-bounds write. The fix zeroes metadata_copy with memset before the copy, guaranteeing NUL termination and bounding strlen() within the allocation.

Timeline

1. Aug 10, 2026, 8:36 PM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 11, 2026, 2:28 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Aug 11, 2026, 2:31 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• zephyr

  From 2.0.0 · fixed in 4.4.2

References 2