Trust of compromised eMudhra root CA in bundled CA stores
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.0p18, 2.4.0p39, 2.3.0p52
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Checkmk, a IT infrastructure monitoring software, is affected because its bundled certificate authority stores (via the "certifi" and "webpki-roots" components) include a root CA that trusts eMudhra intermediate certificates whose private keys have been made public. As a result, the software may accept certificates that should not be trusted, potentially allowing attackers to impersonate secure servers.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Improper certificate validation in Checkmk <2.5.0p18, <2.4.0p39, <2.3.0p52 and 2.2.0 (EOL): the Certificate Authority stores bundled with "certifi" and "webpki-roots" include a root CA that trusts eMudhra (emSign) intermediate certificates whose private keys are public.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Checkmk GmbH Checkmk
From 2.5.0 · fixed in 2.5.0p18; From 2.4.0 · fixed in 2.4.0p39; From 2.3.0 · fixed in 2.3.0p52