User-controlled Duo host permits authenticated SSRF in Psono Server
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Psono Server (Community and Enterprise editions) through version 7.2.3 is affected. An authenticated user can make the server send HTTPS requests to chosen hosts, which can reveal which internal hosts and services are reachable and tie up server workers while waiting on unresponsive targets.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Psono Server CE && EE versions 0.1.0 through 7.2.3 accepted a user-controlled host when configuring a personal Duo device and passed it to the Duo client without an allowlist or explicit timeout. An authenticated remote attacker could cause the server to connect to selected hosts over HTTPS on port 443 and distinguish failure modes, providing an internal DNS and service-reachability oracle. Connections still required TLS certificate validation, and the flaw did not provide arbitrary protocol or port access. Unresponsive targets could also occupy a server worker until the operating-system timeout.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- esaqa GmbH Psono
From 0.1.0 · fixed in 7.2.4