In affected versions of Octopus Server, OIDC token issuer validation was performed inconsistently.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.1.11781, 2026.2.13438, 2026.3.15816
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Octopus Server, an automated deployment platform, is affected by a flaw in how it checks the issuer of OpenID Connect (OIDC) tokens. An attacker who controls a suitably configured illegitimate token issuer could potentially have their token accepted as belonging to a service account that trusts a legitimate issuer, but only if that account has an OIDC identity configured and the attacker knows or can guess its details.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
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In affected versions of Octopus Server, OIDC token issuer validation was performed inconsistently. This could result in a token issued from a suitably configured non legitimate issuer being accepted as a token belonging to a service account from a legitimate trusted issuer. Exploitation requires a service account with at least one OIDC identity configured. An attacker would also need to know or guess some details of that identity in order to be in a position to attempt exploitation.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Octopus Deploy Octopus Server
From 2024.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.11781; From 2026.2.0 · fixed in 2026.2.13438; From 2026.3.0 · fixed in 2026.3.15816