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CVE-2026-116794EUVD-2026-112267

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 0.65
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

The russh Rust SSH library's agent server (in versions from 0.50.0-beta.12 through 0.65.0) fails to call the application's confirmation hook for keys added with the confirm constraint, so applications that rely on that hook to approve signing can have keys used without approval, including by a process or remote host reaching the agent socket. Applications that keep the default confirmation behavior or implement checks in the separate confirm_request hook are not affected by this flaw.

Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.

Read the original description

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now

Affected versions

  • Eugeny russh

    fixed in 0.65

References 4

GitHub · Eugeny/russh