Homebox generic notifier SSRF via HTTP redirect after URL validation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.27.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
HomeBox, a home inventory and organization system, is affected before version 0.27.0 in its generic notifier feature, where redirects from allowed notifier hosts can bypass the product's internal address restrictions. An authenticated user could use this to make the server send requests to internal or cloud metadata addresses, potentially exposing sensitive internal resources.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
HomeBox is a home inventory and organization system. Prior to version 0.27.0, Homebox validates generic notifier URLs with ValidateNotifierURL before creation, update, testing, and scheduled delivery, but shoutrrr sends the request through http.DefaultClient.Do without a CheckRedirect policy that revalidates each Location target. An authenticated collection member can configure a permitted notifier host that redirects to loopback, link-local, cloud metadata, or another blocked destination, causing the follow-up request to bypass the product's SSRF policy. The flaw is reachable through POST /api/v1/notifiers/test for immediate requests and through stored notifiers during scheduled maintenance delivery. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- sysadminsmedia homebox
fixed in 0.27.0