pgAdmin 4: File Manager and storage-path tools act on a different path from the one checked
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 9.19
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
pgAdmin 4 in server mode is affected, specifically its File Manager and storage-path tools (Query Tool file opening, Import/Export, Backup, Restore, and the Google client secret handling). Depending on the operating system and deployment, an authenticated user could read, write, list, delete, or move files outside their intended storage directory, including files of other users. Desktop mode is not affected.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with check_access_permission(), which builds the absolute path with get_abs_path(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: • Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. • Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. • Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also checked the path appended to itself. • Creating a folder could create one in another user's directory. The fix makes check_access_permission() return the path it checked and every caller act on that path, decodes folder paths once, and opens, deletes and renames files relative to directories opened from the storage directory without following symbolic links. Desktop mode is not affected. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4
fixed in 9.19