Arbitrary file read and backend crash through unrestricted provider method calls
- Published
- Last modified
- Status
- published
- Known exploitation
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.25.2
- Public exploit
- None on Exploit-DB
Summary
Postiz, a social media scheduling application, is affected: any signed-in user can invoke internal backend functions through connected channels. The impact is that an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server, including secrets such as the session-signing key, database address, and connected-service credentials, and can also crash the backend with a single request.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Postiz lets a signed-in user ask the backend to run a function on one of their connected channels. The backend did not restrict which functions can be requested, so a user could call internal helper functions that were never meant to be reachable from the web interface. One of those helpers reads a file from the server's disk. A user who connects a channel whose stored token is a file path can have the backend return the contents of any file it can read, including its environment, which holds the secret used to sign login sessions, the database address and the credentials of connected services. Another helper makes the backend process exit with a single request. Self-registration is open by default, so no existing account and no action by another user is needed.
Affected versions
- postiz-app
From 2.23.0 · fixed in 2.25.2